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Democracy and conceptual contestability: reconsider ing conceptions of 
democracy in democracy promotion 
Mil ja K urki1 
Abstract 
 
Democracy is a deeply contested concept: historically, complex debates have revolved 
around the meaning of democracy and the plausibility of differen?? ???????????????????????
However?? ???????????? ??????????? ??????????????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ????
post-Cold War democracy promotion debate as the attention of democracy promotion actors 
and scholars has turned to fine-tuning of policies through which a liberal democratic model 
can be successfully encouraged. It is argued here that the focus on the extension of the reach 
of the liberal democratic mode of governance has resulted in a conceptually impoverished 
appreciation of the multiple meanings that the idea of democracy can take. This article 
suggests that democracy promotion scholars and practitioners do not adequately acknowledge 
or tackle the notion that democracy is an essentially contested concept. This has important  
for their ability to take into account the consequences that considering alternative (non- or 
extra-liberal) models of democracy might have for democracy promotion. To move the 
debate forward, I explore here what serious engagement with the essential contestability of 
                                                 
1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the 
European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) ERC grant agreement n° 202 596. 
The author is the principal investigator of the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
2012). All views remain those of the author. 
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democracy might mean for democracy promotion. I argue that it entails a two-fold move: 
???????????????? ???? ??????????????????? of the conceptions of democracy that democracy 
promoters work with. The latter part of the article examines in detail the reasons that might 
exist for considering such a move as part of the efforts to reformulate democracy promotion 
policies, as well as the potential dangers that might be involved. Despite the fact that 
important difficulties are entailed by the extension of the ???????????????????????????????to 
be considered in democracy promotion, it is argued that important political, normative and 
practical reasons exist for a reconsideration of the conceptual basis of democracy promotion 
in the post-Bush era.  
 
K ey words: conceptual inquiry, essential contestability, theoretical pluralism, models of 
democracy, democratic theory, democracy promotion 
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Democracy and conceptual contestability: reconsider ing conceptions of 
democracy in democracy promotion 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite ?????????????????????????????????????????both political leaders and philosophers the 
20th century has seen a significant change in the fortunes of democratic governance. 
Democracy ??????????? ??????????????????????????? ????????? (Corcoran 1983: 14). Various 
states and international organisations, the US, the EU, and the UN for example, have taken on 
key roles in defining and putting into practice this new religion through various democracy 
promotion and assistance policies. The attempts by democracy promoters to ?spread the 
word? on the virtues of democracy have not gone unnoticed in academia: many books and 
articles have been written in recent decades analysing the successes and failures of 
democratic transitions around the globe. Traditionally many studies have focused on analysis 
of key causal variables facilitating democratisation ?????????????????????????????????????????
Przeworski, 1997; Diamond, 2008) but increasing effort has also been expended on analysis 
of the role of and the motivations informing democracy promotion policies (see e.g. Burnell, 
2000; Youngs, 2002; Smith, 1994; Teixeira, 2008). 
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The democratisation and democracy promotion studies that have proliferated in political 
science and IR have contributed many interesting insights on the fortunes of democracy 
around the world. Yet, they have not ?solved the problem? of democratisation ? it still 
remains something of a mystery why democracy promotion succeeds in one context and not 
another (Shapiro, 1983: x). Moreover, doubts remain about the ability of the current literature 
to deal with the deep problems of contestation that are arising in the international relations of 
democracy promotion. Notably, it has been difficult for policy-makers and researchers to 
come to terms with the fact that many countries now view democracy promotion with great 
scepticism and have started to limit the rights and scope of action of democracy promotion 
agencies (Carothers, 2006; Gershman and Allen, 2006). Also, it has been disconcerting for 
many to take note of the fact that the target publics of democracy promotion interventions do 
not always happily accept the models of democracy that are promoted in their interests 
(Abrahamsen, 2000; Chandler, 2000; Nagel and Mahr, 1999: 99).  
 
The difficulties encountered in democracy promotion have become more widely noted by 
democracy promotion researchers and also policy-makers. Barack Obama, for example, has 
openly recognised the problems that arise from this policy age????? occasionally forceful 
nature, as well as democracy ?????????? inability to adequately listen to the preferences of 
the target publics (Obama, 2006: 315-7). A number of interesting reports have also been 
written recently on possible policy directions that democracy promoters should consider in 
the post-Bush era (Kenneth and Wollack, 2008; Carothers, 2008). Nevertheless, nothing 
fundamental has changed so far in democracy promotion. Certainly no shifts in the 
underlying conceptual framework that informs democracy promotion have taken place, or 
been called for in the re-evaluations of this policy agenda. Crucially, a broad consensus 
continues to exist on the belief that democracy promotion entails liberal democracy 
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promotion, that is, the promotion of certain key liberal democratic procedures ? 
encompassing electoral processes and institutionalisation of rule of law, freedoms of 
expression, press and association. Increasing agreement also exists on the view that these 
procedural aspects of liberal democracy promotion should go along with encouragement of 
respect for ?liberal democratic cultural values?? such as belief in rights of the individual, 
toleration, consensus-building, and the legitimacy of liberal democratic procedural 
governance (Obama, 2006; Smith, 1994; Burnell, 2000; Diamond, 2008).  
 
It is argued here that a better understanding of the problems of democratisation, and 
specifically of the contestation over democracy promotion, may be achieved by adopting a 
new angle to the study of democratisation and democracy promotion. I argue that we should 
not simply focus on tweaking existing policies, nor simply focus on accumulation of further 
empirical data on specific cases of democratisation or democracy promotion. We need to 
instead tackle seriously the conceptual underpinnings of democratisation and democracy 
promotion. This piece specifically argues that it may be justified and useful to open up 
conceptual questions on the meaning of the idea of democracy in democracy promotion. 
Considering the centrality of the idea of ?democracy? to democracy promotion, it is curious 
that exploration of the deep theoretical and conceptual contestation over this concept in 
democratic and political theory is made relatively little of in existing studies on democracy 
promotion or in policy practice. Some contestation over democracy is acknowledged as a 
matter of course ? most academic commentators note that democracy is a contentious concept 
in political history, many even referring to it as an essentially contested concept (Schmitter 
and Karl, 1993: 39; Burnell, 2000: 22; Held, 1996: xi; Whitehead, 2002: 14; Lawson, 1993: 
184; Dahl, 2000, 37). Yet, curiously, democracy, as it is conceived to apply in the 
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contemporary democratisation and democracy promotion context, is understood in a 
surprisingly singular ???????????????????? fashion. 
 
The liberal democratic model undoubtedly has many virtues, not least in its normative and 
emancipatory qualities and its ability to foster stable political systems. It has brought long 
sought-after freedoms and rights to many in democratising states. Yet, a doubt remains 
concerning the problems that may arise from the fact that democratisation and democracy 
promotion literature and practice works solely within the confines of a single democratic 
theory tradition, as rich as this is. Indeed, given that democratic theorists have over the last 
two millennia analysed various different substantive and procedural, normative and 
empirical, economic and political, extended and narrow, participatory and representational, 
statist and non-statist, liberal and non-liberal notions of democracy, and given that different 
theories of democracy have historically been attached to different kinds of political struggles, 
can the rich history of contestation over democracy simply be sidestepped in the 
contemporary era of democracy promotion ? and more importantly, is it sidestepped at our 
peril? If the meaning of democracy is not captured holistically by the liberal democratic 
definitions and policies, and if alternative models of democracy - such as social democracy, 
participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, radical democracy, or cosmopolitan 
democracy - can be conceived parallel to the liberal tradition1, the question arises: should 
alternative models of democracy be considered too in analysis of democratisation and 
democracy promotion and what would be the effect of considering them be?  
 
This paper seeks to explore what it might mean to take seriously the contestability of the idea 
of democracy and to do so specifically in the context of democracy promotion. To set the 
scene, I examine, first, some key contemporary dealings with democracy in the 
 
 
 
vii 
 
democratisation and democracy promotion literature. I argue that there is an inadequate 
recognition in this literature of the contestability of the notion of democracy: as much as 
contestation is acknowledged, this is perceived to take place within the confines of a liberal 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the idea of democracy and what it would mean to take it seriously. I argue that there should 
????????????????????????????????????????????????plurality? and ?????contextuality?????????????????
of democracy. In the final section I examine the reasons that we might have for taking on-
board the idea of essential contestability in the analysis and design of democracy promotion. I 
consider also some of the dangers involved in doing so. I conclude that important normative, 
political and practical problems of democracy promotion may be productively addressed 
through extending appreciation of the conceptual contestability of democracy. Notably 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
democracy and may be able to better understand and negotiate with those actors that call for 
democratisation along lines divergent from the classical liberal democratic model.  
 
L iberal democratic background model and the study of democratisation 
 
Democracy, many academics and political actors argue, is a universal value (Sen, 1999). This 
is not all, however, for it is not only the concept of democracy that has been considered to 
have universal reach but increasingly also the meaning of the concept has been universalised. 
While liberal democracy has played an important role in democracy promotion throughout 
the 20th century (Smith, 1994), this model, it seems, has become even more pronounced, if 
not hegemonic, in the post-Cold War era. When democracy is called for it is overwhelmingly 
a liberal democratic model of democracy that is advocated. What this means is that 
democracy promotion is seen to entail the promotion of free and fair elections, alongside 
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guarantees of individual and minority rights, and the rule of law. The liberal model also often 
goes hand in hand with the encouragement of liberal cultural values in civil society, such as 
belief in inviolability of freedoms and rights of the individual and toleration of a plurality of 
view points. It has often also been attached to the encouragement of liberal capitalist markets.  
 
The focus on promotion of a liberal democratic model is most evident in US democracy 
promotion (National Endowment for Democracy, 2009; State Department, 2009; Obama, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rhetorically more open, still liberal democratic in its core (European Commission, 2006). 
Liberal democratic ideas about democracy are also pre-dominant, albeit in less regimented 
?????? ??? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ????
Charlesworth, 2009). A liberal democratic discourse then is almost universal in debates on 
democracy promotion and democratisation. This has entailed that alternatives to liberal 
democracy have not featured in mainstream democracy promotion practices, alternatives such 
as the social democratic model, participatory models, radical democratic models, 
cosmopolitan models, let alone Islamist and Confucian conceptions of democracy. As 
????????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ???? almost 
completely absent from the 50 or so cases of attempted democratization since 1974 is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The hegemony of the liberal democratic view of democracy has gone curiously unchallenged 
in the post-Cold War world, even among the political left (Mathieson and Youngs, 2006). 
The lack of challenge to it in the policy sphere can be explained by the general ideological 
dominance of liberalism in the post-Cold War world politics and the general loss of 
confidence in the left and other alternatives following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, it 
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is somewhat surprising that this dominance is so readily reproduced in the academic study of 
democratisation and democracy promotion. One would expect the academic literature on 
democratisation and democracy promotion to be well aware of the contestability of the idea 
of democracy in political theory, in history of international relations, and in the lived 
experiences of societies around the world. Curiously, however, outside some important and 
powerful critiques of liberal democracy promotion by a selection of neo-Gramscians 
(Robinson, 1996; Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 1993), a few texts that have examined 
historical contestation over the meaning of democracy (e.g. Whitehead, 1986), and selected 
books examining the contested nature of liberal democracy in different regional contexts 
(Bell, 2006; Sadiki, 2004, Sousa Santos, 2005), in the majority of mainstream 
democratisation and democracy promotion literature relatively little real discussion over the 
contestability of the notion and the significance of such contestability for democracy 
promotion has been evident. 
 
This was especially the case with the so-???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
history thesis, many researchers in democratisation studies considered the end of the Cold 
War to have killed off the alternatives to liberal democracy. For example, Marc Plattner 
(1993: 30), one of the key post-Cold War democratisation scholars, argued that liberal 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
model left, for only they are compatible with economic success and rapidly integrating 
information-intensive world economy. Plattner argued that the death of the Leninist system 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????par excellence, 
everywhere in the world (Plattner, 1993: 29).  
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????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ??????????????? ?????????????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ??? ?????????????????
today. Indeed, liberal triumphalism has been on the back foot in recent years. Rather more 
problematic today is the fact that a liberal democratic discourse now forms an implicit 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
strands of thinking on the meaning of democracy can be detected in the literature: in one 
democracy is perceived as a political system that meets parti???????????????????????????????????
criteria, in the other democratisation is seen to primarily require the development of correct 
??????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ????? ???? ????????????? ???? ???? ???????????
perspectives still work within the confines of a distinctly liberal democratic background 
discourse. The specifically liberal democratic nature of the current engagements with 
democratisation and democracy promotion may not be immediately obvious to the casual 
observer, and indeed may strike many as surprising precisely because of the historical 
contestation that has surrounded democracy. It is for this reason that the current literature and 
the different routes to a specifically liberal democratic position on democracy deserve to be 
analysed in some detail. 
 
Liberal democracy as procedural democracy 
 
Liberal democratic thought has a long and interesting history, which we cannot here examine 
in any detail. One of the interesting things to note about liberal democratic thought is, 
however, that in the 20th century it has entailed the narrowing down of the meaning of the 
idea of democracy. Indeed, an intentionally delimited ??????????????? conception of liberal 
democracy has had a key role to play in 20th century liberal democratic thought.2 This 
procedural model of liberal democracy has been closely associated with a move away from 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????arly measurable 
manner, as a set of procedures related primarily, although not exclusively, to electoral 
mechanisms.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Joseph Schumpeter (1950 [1946]). Schumpeter writing in the 1940s was concerned to avoid 
vague and utopian images of democracy in favour of delineating a conception of democracy 
with clear criteria for analysis of really existing democratic systems. He provided one by 
defining democracy precisely but narrowly - as a governance mechanism for electing leaders. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ????????? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ????? ????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ??? ??? ???? ??????????
(Schumpeter, 1950 [1946]: 296). This view of democracy was liberal in an important but 
minimal sense ? in that each individual had the right to vote and to stand for elections and 
thereby seek to defend their interests in the political system.  
 
This narrow procedural conception of democracy was later on famously elaborated and 
expanded on by Robert Dahl, whose work on polyarchy now sets the core parameters of the 
empirical study of democracy. Dahl set out clear criteria, in terms of procedural elements, for 
what constitutes a polyarchy, his preferred term for the form of rule characteristic of modern 
Western states. Polyarchies for Dahl consisted of several core elements: constitutionally 
elected officials in government, frequent and fairly conducted elections, voting rights for 
practically all adults and the right to stand for elections, almost universal right to express 
oneself without the threat of violence, the right to seek alternative sources of information and, 
freedom to form associations and organisations, including parties, and inclusive citizenship 
(2000: 85-6). Polyarchies, thus defined, were seen to consist of a set of democratic 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ?????
Tocqueville to the Marxists.  
 
??????? ??????????? ????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ?? ???? ??? ????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??e 
study of democracy, even if authors have sometimes added or tweaked some of these criteria 
(Schmitter and Karl, 1993). The procedural notion of democracy, it should also be noted, has 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????whereby democracy 
is associated not only with democratic procedures but also with a narrow sector of social life, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
emphasis on separation of the spheres of the economic and the political. Democracy entails 
procedures for the establishment of a specific kind of political equality (Dahl, 2000: 37). 
Also, procedural democracy is interesting in that, while it is in favour of mass representation, 
it is not directly interested in active participation of citizens in decision-making or debate but 
assumes a fairly passive citizenry (Schmitter, 1995: 18). 
 
In democratisation literature, perhaps the best example of a proceduralist analysis of 
democratisation is Samuel Huntingto????Third Wave, one of the key contributions to analysis 
of democratisation in the early 1990s. Huntington works deliberately with a fairly narrow 
procedural conception of democracy. He does so because he recognises that to derive 
meaning of democracy from ??????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ???
???????????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ????????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ???? ???????
meaning and purpose of democracy. To avoid this contestation, Huntington, drawing on 
Schumpeter, advances a ??????????? ??????????? ??????????? ??? ??????????????? ????????????? ????
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arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-7). In 
defining democracy he acknowledges also the two key aspects of democracy set forth by 
Dahl, contestation and electoral participation, and defines democracy as system of 
representational selection through fair, honest and periodic election in which candidates 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Huntington, 1990: 6-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that was not chosen [through elections] by one that is elected in ?????????????????????????????? 
(Huntington, 1990: 9). 
 
This Schumpeterian-Dahlian definition of democracy is the most precise definition of 
?????????? ??????????????? ???? ??????? ???? ?????????????????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????, 1990: 6-7). While he recognises that certain weaknesses may 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
past contestability of the idea of democracy in political theory to be precisely the problem. 
We should move away from the contested normative debate on democracy towards a narrow 
but commonly agreed upon definition of democracy. Huntington thinks that the 
Schumpeterian and Dahlian framework allows us to move away from the indeterminate and 
long-???????? ??????? ????? ???????????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ?????? ??? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(Huntington, 1990: 6-7). 
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????? ???????????????? ???????????? ????? ??????? ????????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??
minimal procedural liberal democratic form of governance as the standard bearer in 
contemporary politics (see e.g. Przeworski, 1991; Barro, 1999).3 Even when variations in the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
standard against which such variation is me???????? ???? ????????? ???? ??????????? ?????
???????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????? ??????? ?? ?????????????????????? ??????????? ??????
anything from neo-patrimonial to authoritarian and proto-democratic states have been 
identified in the world ? indeed up to 50 different subtypes have been identified ? what is 
???????????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ???????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ????????
background model and indeed a particularly narrow procedural liberal background model 
(Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 434). The sub-types approach presumes the liberal democratic 
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-types 
are delineated.  
 
A procedural liberal democratic notion of democracy has set the terms of debate in 20th 
century political science and its study of democratisation. Yet, it is important to note that the 
proceduralist positions on democracy have been much criticised in recent years.  
 
Liberal democracy and culture: expanding the liberal model 
 
Indeed, while proceduralism still has its advocates, it is important to note that many scholars 
have started to pay significant attention to the cultural contexts of democratic politics, over 
the narrow focus on procedural elements. The shift away from the narrowly procedural 
democratic model has been precipitated by an increased awareness of the problems that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????orld politics. Zakaria argued 
that instead of conceiving liberal democracy simply in terms of electoral proceduralism there 
had to be more conscious realisation amongst researchers of the importance of advocating 
constitutional liberalism, and the values that go with that, in international politics. As Zakaria 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with balloting and promote the gradual liberalization of ??????????. This argument for a more 
extensively liberal democracy over electoral democracy has entailed an important shift in 
emphasis in debates on democracy promotion: from obsession with procedural facets to 
encouragement of liberal rights, values and active civil society participation. Indeed, as 
Chand???????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Larry Diamond (1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2008) one the leading researchers on 
democratisation and democracy promotion, is one key scholar who has tried to move away 
from narrow proceduralism towards taking into account of political culture and varieties in 
?????? ??????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ?? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shift emphasis from analysis of mer????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????? ??? ????????????
??????????????? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ? ????? ??? ???????? ??????????????? ????????? ?? ???????
????????????? ???????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????
Diamond, emphasises the importance of moving away from electoralism towards taking into 
???????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ????????????????????? ??????????????? ????????
?????? ??????? ??? ????????? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????? ?????????
??????????? ???????d, 2000: 17). It follows that promotion of liberal democratic values in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4  
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?????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ???????? ????????? ?????? ??? ??? ???????? ????? ??? ????????
democracy is telling in that it shows that, while there has been a shift in emphasis in 
analysing democracy, there has not been a shift in the background model of democracy. 
While Diamond looks away from the electoral-proceduralist liberal democratic model, which 
he sees as problematic in important senses, he has turned to a liberal-cultural(-proceduralist5) 
model instead. The critique of electoralism and proceduralism has not necessitated rethinking 
the overall model of democracy in any fundamental sense: the liberal democracy and its value 
priorities (liberty of the individual, representation, political equality, rights) still serve as the 
default position within which problems of consolidation are tackled (Jahn, 2005). 
 
This can be seen in the work of many other scholars too. For example, Nagel and Mahr, 
???????? ?????? ???????????? ???? ????? ??? ??????? ????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??????????????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
regional contexts in democratisation (1999: 12), bolster the claim that liberal democracy 
provides the key to democratisation in contemporary politics. Indeed, their analysis of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conceptions of democracy, but rather acceptance of differential paths and time-sequencing of 
policies in (liberal) democratisation (1999: 62-3). While a richer liberal cultural model today 
provides an important corrective to the procedural model, liberal democratic thought and 
values still provide the backdrop for the discussion. 
 
Contestability within the liberal model 
 
Many democratisation theorists have opted, rather unquestioningly, for the liberal definition 
of democracy. But lest we go too far in our attack on the current field, we must note that there 
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are a few authors that have explicitly raised the issue of contestability of the idea of 
democracy in their studies ? authors such as Schmitter and Karl, Burnell and Whitehead. 
These authors deserve close examination. 
 
Schmitter and ??????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????
reference point in mainstream democratisation studies reflecting on the potentially varied 
meanings that the idea of democracy can take. Powerfully, and unusually for the 
democratisation literature, Schmitter and Karl (1993: 40) argue that democracy can take 
various meanings and institutional forms, and also that its meaning is contingent upon socio-
????????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ???
democracy and that Americans should be careful not to identify the concept of democracy too 
????????????? ?????? ???? ?????????????? (summarised in Diamond and Plattner, 1993: xi). They 
also, very provocatively, highlight that different kinds of democracy are not more or less 
democratic than each other but democratic in different ways (Schmitter and Karl, 1993: 41). 
This claim opens up the possibility that there are a variety of qualitatively different models of 
democracy available to us, none of which can be decisively proved correct or incorrect. 
 
???????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ????????? ????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ?Schmitter and Karl, 39). There is for them now a 
???????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????????? ????? ??????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ????
???????????? ???????????? ??? ????????????? ?Schmitter and Karl, 1993: 39). These minimal 
conditions are those referred to by Dahl (Schmitter and Karl, 1993: 44). Indeed, it is the 
procedural definition that Schmitter and Karl return to, although they add some qualifications 
??? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ????????? ??? ???????????????? ??? ????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????
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(1993: 40) democr???? ??? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????????? ??????? ????????? ???????????? ????
their actions in the public realm by citizens acting directly through the competition and co-
?????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ?????????????????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ???? ???
variations in the functioning of liberal democracies, the liberal model is still nowadays the 
consensus model that we should work with. Socialist or radical democratic models outside 
this consensus are then sidestepped.  
 
This return to liberal democracy is al??? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ????? ??? ??????????
??????????? ???????? ??????? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ??? ??? ???????????? ?????????? ?????????
(2000: 22). Burnell recognises also the limitations in the liberal conception of democracy 
advocated in the world system and the existence of alternatives to it. 
 
[T]he notions of democracy that lie at the centre of much democracy assistance, while 
not all being identical, occupy a limited range. First, they are a political construct. Ideas 
of social democracy and economic democracy are excluded. Second, they are informed 
by individualism rather than by expressly communitarian notions of society. Third, 
although many of the formulations specify a range of freedoms and other qualities going 
well beyond mere electoralism and ????? ??????? ???? ??? ????????? ????? ????????????
democracy, even so there are few concessions made to the most radical models of 
?????????????? ????????????????? ?? ???-liberal perspective] much, perhaps all of 
contemporary democracy assistance can look very inadequate ? more akin to rearranging 
??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ????? ???? ????? ??????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ???????
(Burnell, 2000: 4, 23).  
 
 
 
 
xix 
 
Yet, Burnell continues to be attracted to the limited kinds of democracy promotion that arise 
????? ???? ???????? ???????????????????? ???????-procedural views. Also, he explicitly states 
that it would be quite irresponsible for democracy promoters to start promoting models of 
?????????? ??? ?????????????? ????? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ????
end Burnell then too comes to agree with the liberal-democratic consensus view (2000: 28). 
 
Laurence Whitehead does so too, despite the fact that he has powerfully highlighted the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????approaches to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????????
recognises that the liberal model is not self-evident, conceptually or historically - it is merely 
a model on which there is inter-subjective consensus at a specific time in history (2002: 15) - 
interestingly, Whitehead does not seek to challenge the existing inter-subjective consensus on 
the liberal democratic model. He argues ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
contingently and for the present period [the liberal model] provides a rather coherent and 
broad-based exposition of a predominant view. The liberal model therefore provides the 
baseline for the contemporary debates about democratization which occupy the rest of 
this volume (Whitehead, 2002: 26).  
 
While an understandable move, this is also an important decision, for in failing to explore 
meanings of democracy beyond the liberal model, not only are we assuming and reproducing 
an inter-??????????? ?????????? ??? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ??? ?????
???????? ???? ?????? ??? ???-liberal democratic or extra-liberal democratic models that might 
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already exist. What about the advocates of radical democracy in the World Social Forum? 
What about the development activists that wish to reclaim a social rather than liberal 
democratic form of democracy in Africa? Where do these actors and their understandings of 
democracy fit in? 
 
The liberal democratic model has been a very powerful model in current democratisation and 
democracy promotion field, drawing within its remit also those explicitly seeking to open up 
questions of contestability in the field. However, this model is not a neutral model of 
democracy as will be seen and has moreover deterred deep-level engagements with the 
contestability of the idea of democracy. We need to then consider what a more adequate 
treatment of essential contestability might mean. 
 
Democracy and essential contestability 
 
The notion of democracy has divided views over two thousand years: both regarding whether 
it is desirable and over what it means. It is noteworthy that in political theory circles 
?????????? ???? ???? ?? ????? ????? ????? ???????? ??? ??? ????????????? ??????????? ???????? ?????????
1964), a fact acknowledged, if briefly and rather superficially, by select democratisation and 
democracy promotion scholars (Burnell, 2000; 22; Grugel, 2002: 4; Whitehead, 2002: 14). 
But what does essential contestability of democracy mean exactly? 
 
Essential contestability 
 
The idea of essential contestability generally refers to the idea that a concept can take on a 
variety of different meanings at any given time (Whitehead, 2002: 14) or, as Gallie argued 
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?essentially contested concepts are such that their criteria of correct application are multiple, 
evaluative, and in no settled relation of priority with one another?? (paraphrased in Gray 
(1977: 332). Essential contestability means, not only that concepts are contested in a 
historical sense, but that in principle it is impossible to conclusively decide on the correct 
application of the concept (Gray, 1977: 338). It is also important to note that ?an essentially 
contested concept is a concept such that any use of it in a social or political context 
presupposes a specific understanding of a whole range of other contextually related concepts 
whose proper uses are no less disputed and which lock together so as to compose a single, 
identifiable conceptual framework?? ?Gray, 1977: 332). Essentially contested concepts then 
are contested not in isolation but within and between wider value and thought systems.  
 
It is important to note that essential contestability is a challenging notion, not to be taken 
lightly. Why? First, we have to recognise that the essential contestability of social and 
political concepts is a deep challenge to the way in which we use concepts to describe the 
world. Essential contestability means that we cannot, in a simple and direct sense, use 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
understandings of a concept, be it globalisation or democracy, be in disjuncture with the 
interpretation of the same notion by different social actors, but also we must recognise that 
how we decide to conceptualise an idea is a deeply political, normative and ideological 
matter. All conceptual definitions are bound up with complex political, ethical and 
ideological lines of contestation. It follows from this that all theories of a concept that is 
essential contestable are implicated in normative and political power relations and positions: 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ncepts, any kind of social 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
We also must recognise that essential contestability of concepts is an issue closely related to 
the question of theoretical pluralism. Theoretical pluralism refers to a situation where 
multiple theoretical view points can be had about the world around us. There is then no one 
obvious objective truth about the world, but a variety of truth claims can be maintained. 
Essential contestability then points us towards ???????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? 
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It is important to note however that, while a deeply challenging idea, contrary to what is often 
assumed, acceptance of essential contestability of concepts need not mean that we have to 
?????? ?? ????????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ? that all conceptual 
interpretations or theories are as good each other. Indeed, if we are to believe John Gray it is 
impossible to base essential contestability thesis on radical relativism for ?unless divergent 
theories or world-views have something in common, their constituent concepts cannot be 
???????????? even though their proponents a??? ??? ????????? (Gray, 1977: 341-2). Indeed, 
various constructive ways can and have been developed to deal with the question of essential 
contestability and the question of theoretical pluralism (Harding, 1986; Connolly, 1995).  
 
The deep challenges posed by the essential contestability idea are important to consider in 
relation to many social and political concepts ? from terrorism to globalisation. They are 
especially important to consider in debates about democracy, I would argue, one of central 
and most widely accepted essentially contested concepts. But what would taking seriously the 
essential contestability of democracy mean for how we should understand or approach 
debates on democracy among democratisation and democracy promotion scholars? But what 
would taking seriously the essential contestability of democracy mean for how we should 
understand or approach debates on democracy among democratisation and democracy 
promotion scholars?  
 
 
Pluralising and contextualising ???????????democracy?? 
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Many democratisation and democracy promotion scholars, as we have seen, make fleeting 
references to the essential contestability of the idea of democracy. Diamond (2008: 21) for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d (or 
any religious text): ask a room of rabbis (or political scientists) for the meaning, and you are 
??????? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ???????????????????????? ???? ?????????? ??????????????? ???
democracy is treated lightly by many authors, including Diamond: authors tend to merely 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
democracy. I argue here that acceptance of the essential contestability of democracy, if taken 
seriously, necessitates not just that we refer to past contestation over democracy, or recognise 
contestation within the liberal model, but that we seriously tackle two issues: the fact that a 
real plurality of interpretations might exist over what democracy means (beyond the liberal 
democratic canon too) and that conceptions of democracy arise from and are evoked within 
various different contextual settings.  
 
First, it is important to recognise that if we take essential contestability seriously we must 
recognise that there are variations in conceptions of democracy, and not only within the 
liberal model but also beyond it. Classical democratic theory literature is helpful here for it 
has specified a variety of direct and indirect, participatory and representational, 
communitarian and cosmopolitan, narrowly political and more widely economic models of 
democracy, liberal and non- or extra-liberal models of democracy. The main modern 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
1) the liberal representational model, which puts emphasis on defence of individual 
freedoms (to act according to their interests/wishes; this is expressed for example in 
their right to vote freely), representational democratic structures (taking the form of 
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parliamentary systems) and minimal (if effective) state, which safeguards the sphere 
of personal autonomy of citizens.6  
2) ?????????????????????? ???????????????????? ?????? ??????????? ???????????? ???????? ?????
merely formal) democracy resulting from equalisation of social and economic 
inequalities, as well as directly democratic and immediately revocable delegative 
form of democratic institutions (see e.g. Mayo,1955); and 
3) the social democratic model, which works with some liberal democratic structures and 
procedures, but adds to them an emphasis on social solidarity and development of 
institutional structures for democratic control over economic processes, notable over 
general wage levels (Tilton, 1991).  
 
??????? ?????? ????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????? ????????????????????????????
have been envisaged, notably: 
 
4) participatory democracy, which challenges the hierarchical, infrequent and what is 
perceived as elitist forms of representation in liberal democratic systems and which 
puts emphasis on citizen empowerment and active participation in the civil society, 
the work place, as well as in public decision making (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 2003);  
5) radical democracy, which emphasises non-hierarchical and non-state-based agonistic 
forms of democratic politics, focused often around social movement interactions 
(rather than party politics) (see e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985); 
6) deliberative democracy, which emphasises the importance of generating more 
deliberative mechanisms in modern democratic systems, thus generating not only a 
greater role for citizens in democratic governance but also more effective and 
responsive forms of democratic state (Bohman, 1997; Warren, 2008); and 
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7) the cosmopolitan models of democracy, which emphasise the need, through various 
innovative mechanisms including global political parties and global forms of taxation, 
to democratise politics globally as a pre-condition to any meaningful sense of 
democracy within states (Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004). 
 
Beyond these models, various arguments for feminist, green and even Islamist and Confucian 
ideas of democracy have been made (see e.g. Pateman, 1989; Humphrey, 2007; Sadiki, 2004 
and Bell, 2007).  
 
For the sake of space we cannot here examine all these models in detail: to gain a more 
detailed understanding of these models one should turn to their advocates or a number of 
?????????? ?????? ?????????? ?? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ???
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
have significantly diverging views of how society is structured, how democracies function, 
and also of the normative justifications for democracy.  
 
To start with, models of democracy tend to understand society and power relations within it 
very differently. For example, liberal democrats tend to adopt a pluralist approach to political 
power, seeing it widely dispersed in society and with democracy focus on equalising power 
relations between individuals in the formal sphere of the political system only. Socialists and 
participatory democrats, however, explicitly aim to democratise socio-economic power 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
society. Radical democrats on the other hand perceive power as a fluid notion, which is why 
their per???????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ???????????????? ??????? ?????
institutionally entrenched. Cosmopolitans on the other hand perceive certain structural forms 
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of power relations to be so globally entrenched that any attempt to tackle them on merely 
state level will leave most crucial undemocratic mechanisms (such as global economic 
system) intact. Democrats from different theoretical traditions focus on different aspects of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
It follows that models of democracy also envision very different institutional forms as central 
??? ????????????? ???? ????????? ?? ???????? ?????? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????????
representative institutions as the key mode and site of democratic governance. Socialists, 
perceiving electoral democracy in a bourgeois capitalist state as inherently compromised, 
look to delegative systems of democracy premised on equalisation of income and workloads. 
Participatory democrats on the other hand seek to build direct and indirect forms of 
participation into everyday social interactions in the workplace, in the schools or in the 
community. They emphasise democracy on multiple levels, rather than simply on formal 
electoral-representative levels. Radical democrats look to build democracy in the civil society 
through proliferation of social movements7, while deliberative democrats look to new forms 
of public deliberation (such as citizen assemblies) as ways of re-activating democratic 
participation within democratic states. The institutional focal points of different types of 
democrats can vary radically. 
 
The theories of democracy also highlight different sets of values in relation to each other, or 
sometimes the same values but in different priority orders. For example, while the liberal 
model highlights values of political equality, freedom from arbitrary power and consensus 
building, the Marxist and social democratic models highlight values of economic equality and 
justice and conflicts of interests between classes, while participatory democrats highlight 
participation and active interaction of humans as a key aim of democracy. Islamic and 
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Confucian models of democracy on the other hand prioritise respect for communal values and 
challenge secular individualist focus on prote?????? ??? ????????????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ?????
????? ???????? ?????????????? ?????????????? ???? ????? ?????? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????
alternative models of democracy.  
 
????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????he liberal model, 
albeit for different reasons: some because of the perceived elitist inclinations of a model that 
??????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ??? ????????????
???????????????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ????e economic and social inequalities 
intact, others yet for its statist focus. Yet, it is important to note that the relationship between 
the alternative models and liberal democracy is complex, for few critics of liberal democracy 
perceive themselves as absolutely hostile to the liberal democratic model. Most critics see 
some value in the liberal democratic model, even if they argue that it is incomplete or biased 
in defence of certain interests. Indeed, most alternative models seek to complement, re-
radicalise, or fill the gaps of liberal democracy. Alternative models then, while critical of the 
liberal democratic approach and while clearly not reducible to it, have a complex and often 
complementary relationship with liberal democratic thought. 
 
Discussion of alternative models of democracy must inevitably remain superficial here for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
emphasised here is that a variety of distinct models of democracy have been argued for and 
developed in democratic theory literature and, given this, we should take seriously the 
contention that alternative non- or extra-liberal models do exist. If we are to take essential 
contestability seriously, we should not ignore these alternatives, or simply seek to reduce 
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them to variations of the liberal model. We need to give them, and the social and political 
struggles they seek to speak to and in some cases evoke, a hearing on their own grounds.  
 
Second, it should be noted that essential contestability, if taken seriously, also seems to entail 
that we take seriously the differences in social, political and normative contexts from within 
which models of democracy arise. Indeed, essential contestability leads us towards 
recognition not only of the plurality but also of the contextuality of conceptions of 
democracy. Social democracy, feminist democracy, Islamist democracy, and even liberal 
democracy, arise from and are evoked in particular settings and speak to specific political 
struggles and interests. While models of democracy are not necessarily exclusively 
representative of specific groups or historical contexts, they should not be treated as abstract, 
universal or a-contextual either.  
 
Various examples that highlight the contextuality of conceptions of democracy could be 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
East. This illustrates well the importance of recognising contextuality as well as plurality of 
models. Sadiki points out that the problem in the Middle East is not that this region is 
incapable of living up to the standards of the Western conceptions of liberal democracy, but 
rather that the Western liberal view of democracy is not able to take account of the meanings 
attached to democracy in the Middle East (Sadiki, 2004: 10). Sadiki (2004: 4) then argues 
that just because there is no democracy in the Western sense in the Middle East this does not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
contrary, is a widely shared ideal for many people in the region. Yet, it has different 
meanings than in the West and moreover various discourses and counter-discourses of 
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democracy are evident in the region. Sadiki moves to radically contextualise as well as 
pluralise our understandings of democracy in the Middle East.  
 
Sadiki, as well as Daniel Bell (2006) who has contextualised the idea of democracy in 
Chinese context, are sceptical of the singular universalistic liberal notion of democracy. For 
them the co??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the context of different cultural, social and economic discourses and social systems. This 
insight is important because it emphasises that models of democracy are tied in crucial ways 
to social and political contexts and can also represent specific social and political 
experiences, positions, and power relations. 
 
We have here sought to remind ourselves of the meaning of essential contestability and have 
explored what it might mean in relation to conceptions of democracy, arguing that it seems to 
lead us towards the recognition of the plurality and contextuality of conceptions of 
democracy. But why exactly should democratisation and democracy promotion researchers, 
or democracy promotion agencies, need to take into account the contestability of democracy?  
 
Problems and prospects in the promotion of an essentially contested concept 
 
Many democracy promotion researchers have been rather satisfied with the consensus that 
has developed on the idea of liberal democracy since the 1990s, for it has removed many of 
the divisive debates characteristic of debates on democracy during the Cold War (see e.g. 
Smith, 1994: 13; Schmitter and Karl, 1993). It follows that it is often concluded that the 
consensus on the liberal model need not and should not be questioned, even if policies of 
liberal democracy promotion should continually be tweaked and improved. This, I argue is a 
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wrong, and too easy a conclusion to draw. I argue here that there are important reasons ? 
theoretical, normative, political and practical ? to take seriously the essential contestability of 
the idea of democracy. 
Reasons to consider pluralisation and contextualisation of models of democracy promoted 
 
There are, in my view, five important reasons to recognise the contestability of democracy, 
and hence pluralisation and contextualisation of conceptions of democracy, in current 
democratisation and democracy promotion debates.  
 
The first reason is, quite simply, that to not do so would mean ignoring much of democratic 
theory from the last two centuries. Democratic theorists have taken essential contestability of 
democracy to be one of the most basic and crucial starting points in their analysis. Given that 
essential contestability of democracy has been a very broadly accepted notion in democratic 
theory, and given that as a result libraries of books, volumes and articles, have been written 
about contending conceptions of democracy, it would be somewhat curious for researchers 
and practitioners of democracy promotion to completely ignore this. While of course there is 
nothing self-evidently correct or important about academic research into democracy and its 
variations, and while not all ?alternative democratic models??????????????n democratic theory 
are necessarily practicable, surely the insights of democratic theory should at least be 
examined, even if they are then discarded. 
 
However, taking account of the idea of essential contestability does not simply hang on such 
an academic argument. Important normative and political questions are also tied to this 
notion. Indeed, the second reason for recognition of democracy??? ?????????????? is that it is 
normatively and politically important to democratise the debate on democracy in toda????
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context. As Larbi Sadiki (2004) and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2005) have also argued, 
democracy promoters must resist the temptation to think that Western actors or organisations 
????? ????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ?????? ????????? ????
??????????????????????????views on democracy are somehow inadequate, parochial or out-dated. 
If we take ?listening ?????????????????????????? to be a key democratic value (this being a value 
that many liberals, socialists and even radical democrats would appreciate) then hearing and 
explicitly encouraging a plurality of views on the meaning of democracy in academic and 
policy debates, would seem to be desirable. This includes listening to alternatives from 
outside of the liberal democratic consensus and not assuming that all views are simply 
reducible to liberal democratic ideals and priorities. While simply accepting that all views of 
democracy are equally valid would be problematic (see section to follow), it would seem in 
principle democratic to ensure that the currently dominant liberal democratic consensus does 
not silence the non- and extra-liberal perspectives.  
 
Ensuring that a plurality of views is heard seems especially important for debates about a 
concept such as democracy, because this concept is continuously used to justify actions and 
policies in world politics, with important political, economic and social consequences for 
many and varied groups of people, and because, simultaneously, the kinds democracy that are 
advocated by social actors, whether it be liberal democracy promoters, feminist NGOs, 
socialist trade unions, or Middle Eastern democratisers, are also tied in with their social 
experiences, structural positions and political struggles or projects. To fail to listen to other 
conceptions of democracy is to run the risk of failing to listen or to understand the political 
struggles and projects embedded in calls for particular forms of democracy. Recognising 
plurality and contextuality of conceptions of democracy reminds us not to assume a 
dictatorial perspective on debate on democracy and also points us to consider the inherent 
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biases and weaknesses that may inhere in the positions we ourselves hold. This does not 
???????????????????????????? that we cannot disagree with invocations of other conceptions of 
democracy. But it does mean that democratisation and democracy promotion scholars should 
consider ways in which they can at least promote listening to alternatives rather than 
reproducing the tendency to dictate what consti?????? ?? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ???
democratisation.  
 
This emphasis on contestability and pluralist of views on democracy flies in the face of the 
????? ???? ??????????? on democracy advocated by many liberal and conservative democracy 
promoters. While there is a definite attraction to the consensus model view of democracy 
(this is discussed later), it should be noted that this position, at least normatively, is not self-
evident. The consensus model approach is one that, while facilitating concerted action by 
organisations, also shuts down debate on those models that do not fit the consensus and hence 
silences the views of those whose political ideals reach beyond the lowest common 
denominator consensus. Indeed, it should be noted that the consensus view is premised on 
particular hierarchy of democratic values: it highlights the values of efficiency, consensus 
and order over other democratic values such as difference, debate and antagonism (Mouffe, 
2005). 
 
The third reason to consider the pluralisation and contextualisation of models of democracy is 
that such a move allows us to recognise variation in the meaning and scope of democratic 
politics. It is important to understand that democracy can exist and be appreciated in very 
different senses by social actors ?????????????????????????????????????????different spheres of 
social life. Liberal procedural democracy is one face of democracy but it has many other, 
often un-noted, faces, within and between polities. Forms of democracy can also be practised 
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in local communities, work places, or in global civil society movements and through a variety 
of means, including voting but also delegation, consensus-building methods and deliberation. 
Importantly, not all actors necessarily prioritise the liberal sense of democracy: for some 
development actors social democracy is not a secondary ????-???? ??? ??????? democracy and 
for some green NGOs local and global forms of participatory democracy are more important 
than passive liberal citizenship rights. The dominance of the singular liberal view of 
democracy can dangerously hide this plurality of senses of democracy.  
 
Pluralisation of ideas on democracy brings home that radically different conceptions or 
models of democracy can complement, co-exist and work across different terrains of social 
life in complex ways. Indeed, it is important note that models of democracy are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. A liberal and a radical model of democracy for example are 
not necessarily in contradiction with each other. Models of democracy can also apply to 
different social terrains: while the liberal democratic and the classical social democracy 
models are overwhelmingly state-centred, other models reach beyond and below the 
traditional state-focus, allowing not only different senses of democratic practice but different 
terrains of democratic practice to be worked with. Radical democracy for example looks 
below the state level representational democracy and calls for agonistic politics between 
individual and social groups across state borders or classical party system lines (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1986; Mouffe, 2005). Cosmopolitan models of democracy too explicitly expand the 
scope, instruments and methods of democratic governance to the inter- and transnational 
sphere, this necessitating movement away from classical liberal democratic procedures and 
identity politics. Pluralising and contextualising conceptions of democracy allows 
democratisation and democracy promotion researchers, and hence perhaps also practitioners, 
to keep open the possibility that democracy can exist, and may perhaps be promoted, not just 
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on liberal (procedural or cultural) lines within states but in a plurality of senses, in different 
ways and in different spheres of social life. Not only does this move us away from 
prioritising of liberal type of state-centered democracy as the end of point of democratisation 
but it also arguably potentially enables a wider range of actors to be incorporated into 
democratisation agenda. 
 
Fourth, pluralisation and contextualisation of models of democracy may be important because 
it allows democratisation researchers to better understand and deal with problems in current 
democracy promotion, notably, why certain groups of people might contest the approaches to 
democratisation that western IGOs and NGOs advocate. Many development theorists and 
analysts of democratisation in Eastern Europe for example have highlighted that the 
democracy promotion guided through in these contexts has missed out on the fact that the 
target populations themselves have been critical of the kinds of liberal democracy advocated 
in their name and have in fact envisioned the type of democracy they are after quite 
differently from the current democracy promotion guidance (Abrahamsen, 2000; Chandler, 
2000; Sadiki, 2004; Bell, 2006). Recognising that ???????????????????democracy promotion 
might be essentially contested is an important point to be appreciated in allowing scholars 
and practitioners in the field to deal with the kinds of calls for alternative conceptions of 
democracy that we see in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia or Middle East, where not just 
democracy but alternative ?non-liberal democratic?? ?? ??????-???????? ??????????????????? ???
democracy are proposed. Looking at the world through the liberal lenses, democracy 
promoters can too easily side-step such calls. Instead of facing with discomfort the 
??????????? ??????? calls for social democracy, Middle E??????????? ?????? ???? ?slamist 
democracy, or African ?????? ?????? ??? radical participatory or green democracy, perhaps 
democratisation researchers, and democracy promoters, should start by opening their eyes to 
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quite legitimate variation in views on democracy. This would be normatively desirable but 
also practically desirable in allowing productive engagement to emerge between critical (or 
even hostile) target publics and democracy promoters. It is important to remember that those 
actors that turn to alternative models do so for a reason: often because the liberal democratic 
ideas are seen as incapable of addressing their concerns (for example, deep-seated structural 
gender inequality, economic injustice or cultural disempowerment). For democracy 
promoters to fail to listen to alternative non- and extra-liberal perceptions of democracy is to 
run the risk of failing to understand the wider political struggles that surround the invocation 
of these conceptions. As I will discuss in the next section, listening to plurality of views on 
democracy is of course difficult in practice, yet it can facilitate imagining more effective 
policies on the ground.  
 
Beyond the theoretical, normative/political and practical reasons discussed above, there is 
one further reason for the move suggested here. Instead of assuming that the problem of 
democracy has been solved, either conceptually or historically, an assumption that is 
?????????? ????????? ??? ???????????????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ????????
attitudes, the move here suggests that the conceptual puzzles of democracy need to be opened 
up for continuing debate. This is important in keeping ?history open? for debate on future 
forms of democracy. Contrary to the teleological thinking embedded in much of the 
triumphalist liberalism, there is a need for a more open-ended approach to democracy. 
History is not at its end, history is radically open, if not indeterminate (Patomäki 2003). This 
means that democracy must also be approached with an open-ended view, with our minds 
???????????????????????? ????????????? ??????????? Indeed, I support the position of Held and 
Patomäki on the need to imagine different democratic futures, futures embedded in but not 
confined to the existing empirical order (Held, 1996: 44; Patomäki, 2003). Democracy, as a 
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mainstream figure such as Guillermo ?????????? (2007) has also recently recognised is a 
concept that is open ended, dynamic, normative, and inherently critical of existing structures. 
This means that debate should be kept going on its meaning in order to envision alternative 
democratic futures. Remaining attuned to the contested nature of democracy and the 
contextuality of conceptions of it, helps us to move away from teleological frameworks, 
towards a more radically open, and I would suggest, more progressive view of change in 
world politics.  
 
There seem to be a number of theoretical, normative, political, and practical reasons to 
reconsider the contestability of democracy in democratisation and democracy promotion 
research. But what are the limitations, difficulties, and even dangers of such an approach? 
These need to be considered carefully. 
 
Dangers of pluralisation and contextualisation of democracy in democracy promotion 
 
The first difficulty with the approach suggested here is that it goes sharply against the grain 
of the views of many hardened liberals in the field and, importantly, challenges the widely 
????? ?????????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????? ????????????? ??? ??? liberal 
mainstream will undoubtedly point out that, since hard historical experiences have led us 
towards the consensus on the value of liberal democracy, to open this consensus up for debate 
would be to take a step back ??????????????????????????????????An important related problem 
that encourages caution among many is that downgrading the consensus model might 
problematically legitimate calls for ???????-??????? ??????? ?f democracy, such as ?social 
democracy?, in contemporary world politics.  
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These lines of criticism are, while to be expected, fairly problematic. To argue that the liberal 
democratic consensus that now exists constitutes an end point in debate about democracy is a 
questionable claim, not least because it entails a curious teleological conception of 
democracy, politics and history. Also, the simple empirical fact that debate on democracy 
seems to have continued in many quarters of world politics, even if often outside the liberal 
Western states, international organisations, and democracy promotion scholarship goes 
towards disproving any such claims. It is also not as well to remember that the argument that 
the Marxist or social democratic models of democracy are now dead because of the 
experiences in the USSR or 1990s Sweden are far from conclusive (Callinicos, 1991; Ryner, 
2002). 
 
However, another far more serious line of attack that can be raised against the moves 
suggested here is that opening up debate on democracy might lead to dangerous denigration 
of international democracy promotion as we know it. The lowest common denominator 
approach may have its problems but it also has advantages: it results in a fairly consensual if 
also limited forms of democracy promotion. Not only has this approach arguably had some 
successes, but also the minimal liberal approach is practical in international environment in 
that it requires minimum consensus and in that its promotion is more readily measurable, a 
key criteria for any funding body with auditing mechanisms in place expecting measurable 
results. Opening up this consensus may lead not only to unwieldy and corrosive debate but 
also quite possibly the advancement of criteria for democracy promotion that are too vague or 
ambitious to be practicable. If we lack clear criteria on what democracy is, can it even be 
????????????And how would we practically promote or encourage multiple models? These 
are unsettling questions for all those involved in developing practical democracy promotion 
measures. Given the need for basic agreement on policies and the need to measure the 
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effectiveness of funded activities against clearly defined criteria, it seems dangerous indeed 
to abandon the consensus on the minimal procedural model. If we can agree on the ???????
?????????????? ????? ????? (e.g. on level of fairness of elections, or the efficiency of 
institutionalisation of rule of law, level of activity in civil society) this provides us at least 
with clear criteria against which to evaluate democracy promotion policies.  
 
Nevertheless, a doubt remains: if democracy is a contested concept, there might be something 
amiss in advancing democracy by simply measuring how well states ?????? ??? ?????? pre-
???????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????????? documents. With conceptual contestability in 
mind, not only might we have to consider radically rethinking the boxes to tick (expanding 
criteria) but perhaps we should also question the very idea of ????? box?? ??????????
promotion.  
 
To think of such a possibility is of course deeply troubling within the current setting. Yet, the 
discomfort with existing answers may not be entirely unproductive. First, it is important to 
note that we need not simply throw away existing experience, measures and policies in liberal 
democracy promotion. We can also proceed by simply explicitly recognising the specificity 
(and political partiality) of the kinds of assumptions that are embedded within the existing 
policies. This would mean recognising what the existing policies do and do not do, who they 
do and do not include. Many lessons can here be learned from the critics of liberal 
democratisation (Sadiki, 2004; Sousa Santos, 2005; Robinson, 1999). Simultaneously, 
democracy promoters may also want to consider making further openings in their policies 
and language towards wider perspectives on democracy and the various views expressed in 
target states. There are already some tentative openings in the direction of extra-liberal 
models of democracy in EU??? ?????????? ????????. These can and should be explicitly 
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expanded on. Such moves might go hand in hand with active encouragement that democracy 
promotion agents develop their capacities in political and normative reflection on plurality of 
democratic thought.  
 
We might also consider changing the language of promotion. There has already been a shift 
in some circles from ?????????????promotion? to ?????????assistance? (Burnell, 2000), but there 
is something to be said, with our considerations in mind, for a further moves in this regard, 
for moves to language of ?democracy facilitation?, ?encouragement? or better yet ?democracy 
dialogue?. Such language would imply less of a student-teacher relationship between West 
and the rest, and a more dialogical and multilateral approach to democracy debate.  
 
Reframed democracy promotion with essential contestability in mind might also entail 
reframing policy initiatives and funding calls in such ways as to explicitly open up room for 
??????-liberal democratic?? ?????????? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ?e.g. by removing obvious 
references to promotion of liberalisation). We might then ??????????encouraging??????????????
models of democracy in target countries by funding organisations that encourage forms of 
democratic politics that may not conform or seek to reproduce the classical liberal democratic 
politics but instead advocate socialist, feminist, Islamist, green or even cosmopolitan forms of 
democracy. In many states such organisations exist and hold hopes for peaceful and more 
integrative participatory democracy but often either have not wanted to be seen as stooges of 
Western democracy promotion or get over-looked by Western actors because they do not 
conform to liberal conceptions of democracy but rather seek socialists or radical democratic 
forms of democracy or closed community-based participatory democracy. We may also 
consider integration of democracy dialogue with wider policy debates on development and 
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trade. As Obama has recognised too, democracy promotion can work cross-purposes and 
appear hypocritical given Western trade policies (2006: 317).  
 
Although within some agencies tentative openings in the direction suggested here exist (e.g. 
???????????????????????? ?aking into account the suggestions here is ?a lot to ask?. Given the 
difficulty of the demands, however, it follows that democracy promoters may have to 
evaluate whether and how far they ????????? ??? ??? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ?f perspectives. 
Balancing support for different social forces and their different ideals of democracy is not 
easy, and may ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. For 
example, the US might decide not to encourage socialist and radical democratic models or 
organisations. Other actors, EU for example, might opt for a more pluralistic approach. In 
either case, however, if the alternative models were seriously considered the process of 
democracy promotion would be more open, politically reflective and would move us away 
from the current practice, which, as critics have documented, runs the risk of encouraging 
only limited forms of democratisation under a technocratic cloak. Such a pluralistic and 
openly politicised agenda might make democracy promotion, or democracy dialogue, more 
effective in responding to problems on the ground and in being able to deal with the 
contestation that currently exists.  
 
Finally, let us discuss another difficult problem that arises from the move suggested here and 
that is likely cause consternation among democratisation and democracy promotion 
researchers. The arguments here create a tendency towards relativisation of the idea of 
democracy in international politics. But does pluralisation and contextualisation of 
conceptions of democracy mean that we are in no position to criticise regimes on grounds of 
their lack of democracy? Is Chinese system just as democratic ? just on different grounds ? as 
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the US or the Swedish system? Or is the specific cultural context in Nigeria a viable excuse 
for the inability of the state to institute adequate democratic representation in the country? 
Pluralisation and contextualisation critics could say are synonyms with relativism and 
nihilism.  
 
The dangers of relativism are real enough. Yet, first, it is important to note that the consensus 
approach, as we have seen, is not self-evidently superior either; it fails to recognise diversity 
of viewpoints on democracy, which has multiple negative effects as documented earlier. 
Second, and crucially, we must note that pluralisation need not entail relativisation. Just 
because we pluralise conceptions of democracy this does not mean that we cannot evaluate 
some systems to be significantly less democratic than others, or indeed as non-democratic. It 
merely means that we should do so in reference to multiple criteria. Even with multiple 
criteria we can still say that the claims to democratic status by North Korea or Congo are 
problematic. Indeed, we can say that they are undemocratic on numerous grounds ? these 
regimes fail on liberal, social democratic, participatory and deliberative criteria of 
democracy. Assessments in other contexts may be more complex, however. For example, 
measured on liberal democratic grounds (representativeness, liberty) we can say that both 
Russia and China are either limited or non-democracies. In relation to social democratic 
criteria they could however be seen to contain some aspects of socio-economic democracy, 
given that both still emphasise the role of the state in guaranteeing a semblance of economic 
equality. Also, they may not be entirely undemocratic on aspects of participatory democracy. 
On the other hand, we should note that ?????? ???????? ??????? ??????????? according to social 
democratic criteria some of the most liberal democratic states do rather poorly. Also, some of 
the liberal states do less than satisfactorily with regard to preferences of many participatory 
democrats, especially with the sharp downturn of democratic participation and civil society 
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activism in many Western liberal democratic states. With pluralisation and contextualisation 
of the idea of democracy, evaluations of democratic systems become less cut and dry, yet 
they need not become relativistic. This may be uncomfortable in challenging Western 
political and normative superiority in current debates on democracy, but nevertheless presents 
an interesting opening for a more pluralistic level of debate on democratisation and 
democracy promotion. 
 
Conclusions: conceptual reflexivity and democracy promotion 
 
Democracy promotion has been a major political project during the late 20th and early 21st 
century but is also a project that is increasingly contested: in the aftermath of Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Ukraine many target states are sceptical of the democracy promotion agenda 
(Carothers, 2006). How are we to deal with this development? One response is to accept, on 
realist lines, that th???????????????????????????????has reached its zenith and its usefulness as 
a foreign policy agenda is now limited. Hence, perhaps we should now downscale this agenda 
in favour of other more useful ways of defending national interests. On the other hand 
commentators with a more liberal bent would be unwilling to concede such a conclusion and 
would instead argue that we must remain resolved to promoting democracy in world politics. 
For them, we must be willing to learn from the hardships of democracy promotion and tweak 
the democracy promotion policies so as to equip them to better deal with the many challenges 
they face.  
 
There is another possible response, however: a response that is informed not by a sceptical 
stance or ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? returning to 
important conceptual issues at the heart of democracy promotion agenda: to the conceptions 
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of democracy promoted in the world system, to investigation of what is at stake in the 
conceptual categories we use. This approach does not accept either the self-evident normative 
superiority of democracy, nor that it is wrong to promote democracy in world politics. Rather 
it puts focus on the complex and power-ridden politics involved in the - often implicit - 
contestation over the meaning of democracy in international relations. This paper has argued 
for this conceptual angle to democratisation and democracy promotion, and in so doing has 
argued for pluralisation and contextualisation of conceptions of democracy in the world 
system. It has considered the pros and the cons of such a move and has come to the tentative 
conclusion that a move towards more open debate on conceptions of democracy might be an 
important and useful step in international relations, especially in dealing with democracy 
promotion.  
 
This approach has some difficulties and dangers associated with it. For example it might 
result in the breaking down of consensus on the liberal model and also relativisation of debate 
on democracy. It also raises the difficult question: if there are many models of democracy and 
these are contextual, can democracy be promoted at all? These questions (and many other 
questions that we have not discussed here, such as questions about the ethics of democracy 
promotion) are difficult but also essential to consider. By pushing us to deal with these 
questions the approach here has some potential in furthering debate in two regards. First it 
allows us to be more open - historically, politically and theoretically - to the plural meanings 
of democracy and how this concept is used in various social and political struggles and 
contexts in different ways by different actors. Quite simply, we can see that if we fail to listen 
to and acknowledge alternative models we also fail to potentially listen to and acknowledge 
social and political actors in different roles from us, who might have very different views on 
successes and failures of liberal democracy. Also, democratising debate on democracy might 
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lead to a more equal and a more dialogical approach to democracy promotion, where 
democracy is promoted on multiple levels and in multiple senses. This may allow democracy 
promoters to better understand the attitudes to democracy and democracy promotion of those 
target populations whose differing voices can be within the liberal paradigm,  too readily 
ignored. 
 
Of course putting to practice such an approach in democracy promotion agencies is not going 
to be easy and some actors might even reject it. Also, much more work needs to be done on 
how aims of pluralisation and contextualisation might be effectively integrated into a policy 
process ????????????????????????????????????????????????. Yet, in the meanwhile it is important 
to recognise that conceptual contestation, and the political disagreement it reveals, should not 
be ignored for the sake of mere convenience. We should not forget that thought on 
democratisation and democracy promotion, and thought on democracy, ?????????? ??? ????
????????? ???? ??????? ?????? (Corcoran, 1983: 22). Engaging in conceptual debate on 
democracy in democracy promotion then is not just an abstract conceptual exercise, but in 
itself implicated in important global struggles over social and political power. 
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1 The problem is not just the liberal tradition but the dominance of particular variants within it. Liberal 
democratic thought itself is much wider and richer than current debates portray. 
2 On link between liberalism and procedural democracy see Bobbio (2005: 37-8). 
3 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
4 This implies a movement away from emphasis on passive electoral citizenship. Yet, advocacy of liberal values 
in civil society does not necessarily equal encouragement of real participation or empowerment of citizens. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????ork against or challenge the consensus on liberal proceduralism 
and cultural values, do not sit easily with such a model of civil society. Indeed, liberalism has a very specific 
understanding of the role of civil society, which is contested by many more radical social actors (see Baker, 
2002). 
5 The role of procedures is still seen as important by most liberal-cultural analysts. One of the key values to be 
entrenched is in fact the belief in the value of proceduralism. 
6 It should be noted that the liberal democratic tradition is rich, however, and that liberal democracy can also be 
conceived in more social-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
values (see e.g. MacPherson, 1977). 
7 In liberal democracy the ro?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
procedures on the state level (see Baker, 2002). 
